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Abstract
What are the implications of Brexit for the nature, role, and potential of Franco-German leadership in the EU? Brexit, we
contend, is both an expression and a further cause of two broader underlying developments in the contemporary EU: First,
a stronger andmore prominent German part and position, and second, disintegrative tendencies in several EU policy fields
and the EU polity as a whole. This, in turn, has major implications for Franco-German bilateralism and for Franco-German
leadership in the EU. In light of a stronger Germany, a relatively weaker France, and significant centrifugal forces, the two
largest EUmember statesmust not only realign their bilateral relationship butmust also act as a stabilizer in and for the EU.
We show that during the EU’s recent crises, not least during the Brexit negotiations and the recovery from the Covid-19
pandemic, France and Germany did exercise joint leadership. We also show, however, that major discrepancies persist
between the two countries in particular policy fields and with regard to longer-term European objectives. Brexit, with its
numerous calamities and implications, thus once again moves Franco-German leadership—and its shortcomings—to cen-
ter stage in Europe. When it comes to leadership in the EU, there remains no viable alternative to the Franco-German duo.
Yet, in order to provide constructive leadership and successfully shape the EU, the two countries must bridge substantial
differences and be ready to carry disproportionately high burdens.
Keywords
bilateralism; Brexit; Covid-19; EU; France; Germany; leadership
Issue
This article is part of the issue “What Brexit Means for Europe: EU Institutions and Actors after the British Referendum”
edited by Edoardo Bressanelli (Sant’Anna School of Advanced Studies, Italy) and Nicola Chelotti (Loughborough University
London, UK).
© 2021 by the authors; licensee Cogitatio (Lisbon, Portugal). This article is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribu-
tion 4.0 International License (CC BY).
1. Introduction
In the early hours of 9 December 2011, British Prime
Minister David Cameron famously vetoed a revision
of the Treaty of Lisbon, the contractual basis of the
EU. France’s President Nicolas Sarkozy and Germany’s
Chancellor Angela Merkel had suggested a new EU-wide
treaty to tighten national budgetary discipline in an
attempt to salvage the common currency and put an end
to the Eurozone crisis. They had not been willing to give
in to Cameron’s demands for British exemptions and con-
cessions to its financial services sector.
Cameron’s veto pleased many policymakers from
his Conservative Party and the British Eurosceptic press.
Going further, he asserted that if British interests were
not served, its membership in the EU was no longer a
given (Traynor, Watt, & Gow, 2011). Little more than a
year later, Cameron would hold out the prospect of a
British referendum on EU membership, which eventual-
ly triggered Brexit. Meanwhile, France and Germany had
convinced 25 of the then 27 EU member states to sign a
‘fiscal compact’ on closer economic and fiscal integration
on an intergovernmental basis, bypassing British opposi-
tion and leaving the UK further outside the EU’s core.
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This episode is one of the last and most prominent
examples of Franco-German leadership in the pre-Brexit
EU. Since then, the EU has come under pressure in many
ways—most notably with the UK: for the first time, a
country has withdrawn from EUmembership. In this arti-
cle, we contend that Brexit is both an expression and a
further cause of two broader underlying developments
in the contemporary EU: First, Germany in recent years
has moved to center stage. It plays an ever stronger and
more prominent part in EU politics, making German con-
sent indispensable for any agreement at the EU level.
And second, disintegrative tendencies in several EU pol-
icy fields and the EU polity have put the form and sub-
stance of European integration into question. We fur-
ther argue that this, in turn, has major implications for
Franco-German bilateralism and Franco-German leader-
ship in the EU. In light of a stronger Germany, a relative-
ly weaker France, and significant centrifugal forces, the
two largest EUmember statesmust not only realign their
bilateral relationship but must also act as a stabilizer in
and for the EU.
In this article, we take on two tasks. First, we show
that in moments of existential crisis in recent years,
France and Germany did exercise joint leadership. When
the EU as a polity and the future of European inte-
gration were at concrete risk, the two countries stuck
together, managed to reconcile their national prefer-
ences and interests, and led the way toward a common
European response to the pressing challenge. We illus-
trate this by examining France and Germany’s role dur-
ing the Brexit negotiations and the Covid-19 pandemic.
Second, however, we also show that major discrepan-
cies persist between the two countries in particular poli-
cy fields and with regard to longer-term European objec-
tives. When one partner is more negatively affected by
specific developments or policies than the other, and
when a joint role and response to a challenge appear
less urgent, Franco-German leadership is less likely to
materialize and to have a significant impact on EU poli-
tics. The Eurozone reform discussions, EU defense policy,
and EU asylum and migration policy exemplify this.
We scrutinize the role, relevance, and implications
of European political leadership both with regard to
different policy fields and challenges, and within the
Franco-German duo itself. Our cases represent impor-
tant instances of European integration and EU politics
in recent years. Comparing various crises and challenges,
this article holds that explaining important variation in
integration outcomes requires consideration of different
degrees of Franco-German leadership. The different out-
comes show us when, why, and how Franco-German
leadership is likely to emerge and engender impact in
post-Brexit EU politics. We ground our analysis in prima-
ry sources including official member state and EU docu-
ments, newspaper reports, and the wider academic lit-
erature on political leadership, Franco-German bilateral-
ism, and EU crisis politics. Importantly, absent a more
determined Franco-German leadership and, in particu-
lar, a more courageous German part, the EU risks yet
moremuddling through or stalling. We conclude by argu-
ing that when it comes to leadership in the EU, there
remains no viable alternative to the Franco-German duo.
This alone, however, will not be enough given the various
challenges and uncertainties the EU is facing.
2. Franco-German Leadership in the EU
Political leadership is an often invoked but also contro-
versial and contested concept, not least in the context
of European integration. European integration—that is,
the process after the Second World War of European
nation states working together ever more closely in polit-
ical and economic affairs and increasingly pooling their
sovereignty at the European level—was in essence an
“anti-hegemonic construction” that sought to diffuse and
share power between the different actors and put an
end to the disastrous balance-of-power politics in Europe
(Schild, 2010, p. 1370). At the same time, however, lead-
ership is often necessary to give guidance, overcome col-
lective action problems, and provide stability to a politi-
cal system—particularly during moments of uncertainty
or accelerated change. Leadership can also help, in ‘nor-
mal’ (non-crisis) times, to sound out common ground for
reforms and progress on particular political issues.
Due to its anti-hegemonic character, permanent
political leadership in the EU by a single member state
wouldmeetmajor resistance and hence is unlikely. In the
history of European integration, France and Germany
have therefore jointly assumed the leadership role on
numerous occasions. The original purpose of European
integration was also a response to the decades-long
antagonism, struggle for supremacy, and war between
these two countries (Krotz, 2014). As founding members
of today’s EU, French and German political elites feel a
special responsibility to preserve and foster the peaceful
political and economic unification of Europe. They can
thereby draw on a unique set of political, administrative,
and public ties. Indeed, today’s Franco-German “embed-
ded bilateralism” is the most institutionalized form of
member state cooperation within a regional political
organization (Krotz & Schild, 2013).
Moreover, France and Germany are the two biggest
countries in the EU which often have available the
necessary political, material, institutional, and ideal-
ist resources to provide leadership. A recent survey
amongst politicians and experts has confirmed that
Germany and France (in this order) are the most contact-
ed and most influential EU countries (Busse et al., 2020).
Generally, leadership is possible when there is demand
for it amongst political actors, and when a single actor
or small group of actors is able and willing to supply
it. Leadership demand might result from increased sta-
tus quo costs for member states, while leadership sup-
ply depends on the leader’s expected costs and bene-
fits of leading. Leadership in and of the EU tends to be
successful and to have a real impact when the leader(s)
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manage to reconcile their own preferences and interests
with those of their followers and to enable the achieve-
ment of common objectives (Schoeller, 2019, pp. 28–40).
Franco-German bilateralism and its impact on EU pol-
itics comprises three main types of leadership: the pro-
motion of further European integration; closer cooper-
ation and forms of differentiated integration; and cri-
sis management and the overcoming of decision-making
deadlocks. France and Germany may exercise such lead-
ership in threemainways: (1) setting the political agenda,
either by submitting their own proposals or by removing
competing proposals from the agenda; (2) building con-
sensus and brokering compromises between themselves
and then between different camps of member states;
(3) andwielding coalitions of like-mindedmember states,
especially in situations in which large majorities are nec-
essary for an agreement. They then can overrule oppo-
sition and sideline reluctant members, as was the case
with David Cameron in the run-up to the fiscal compact
(Krotz & Schild, 2013, pp. 20–22).
In recent years, Franco-German leadership in the EU
has become at once more challenging and more essen-
tial (Krotz & Maher, 2016). On the one hand, after var-
ious enlargement rounds, we see a larger and more
heterogeneous EU in terms of political culture, eco-
nomic interests, and national policy preferences. More
importantly for Franco-German leadership, Germany
has occupied a more prominent and at times dom-
inant position. Especially during the global financial
and subsequent Eurozone crises, but also during the
Covid-19 pandemic, Germany’s superior economic and
fiscal position revealed a growing asymmetry within the
Franco-German duo. Germany, it seems, has become
the “indispensable nation” for any agreement on the
EU level (Sikorski, 2011). France, by contrast, has strug-
gled for years with slow or no economic growth as well
as political and social divisions and protests that have
challenged its entire political system. What is more, the
anti-EU National Rally (formerly Front National)—the
largest political force in France in the 2019 European par-
liamentary elections—promotes more nationalist posi-
tions and makes negotiating successes at the EU level all
the more important for the French president (Bulmer &
Paterson, 2019, p. 13).
On the other hand, various centrifugal forces and dis-
integrative tendencies have rattled selected policy fields
and even the entire EU polity. Brexit, of course, is the
single most obvious embodiment of this development.
That a country has for the first time opted to withdraw
from EU membership led some scholars to speak of a
“European disintegration” (Webber, 2019, pp. 19–30; see
also Schramm, 2020). In the immediate aftermath of
the referendum, some scholars speculated that Brexit
could create and further increase the incentives for other
member states to follow the British example and with-
draw from the EU membership. In any event, Brexit
has once again moved Franco-German leadership into
focus, since it increases the visibility and relative impor-
tance of the two remaining largemember states (Krotz &
Schild, 2018).
But the EU has seen other disintegrative tendencies
aswell. During the Eurozone crisis from2010 to 2015, the
common currency came under severe pressure, reveal-
ing the shortcomings in its institutional design and push-
ing somemember states to the edge of exit. In themigra-
tion crisis of 2015 and 2016, the ongoing clash amongst
member states over a quota system and the more equal
distribution of refugees led not only to the undermining
of common EUdecisions but also to the reintroduction of
border controls within the Schengen free-traveling area.
And the ‘Covid-19 summit’ of July 2020 revealed differ-
ent and opposing coalitions of Northern, Southern and
Eastern member states, which were in severe dispute
over the size, allocation, and governance structure of a
European economic recovery fund.
After the election of the pro-European Emmanuel
Macron as President of France in May 2017, there were
high expectations that France, together with Germany,
could lead the way to a much-needed reform and impe-
tus for the EU. In a speech at the Sorbonne University
in September 2017, Macron called, among other things,
for a separate budget tomake the Eurozonemore robust
and formore integration in defense and security to trans-
form the EU into a true political player on the glob-
al stage (French Presidency, 2017). Despite some occa-
sional rhetorical expressions of support and the public
and symbolic cultivation of the Franco-German relation-
ship (Krotz, 2002), the new German government, which
took office in March 2018, never really engaged with the
Macron proposals. This, however, contrasts the promi-
nent role that France andGermany played in themanage-
ment of both the Brexit and the Covid-19 crises. In both
cases, the two countries assumed joint leadership, seek-
ing to keep the EU member states together and showing
ways to deal with the pressing challenges.
In order to explain this variation and document the
distinctive role of France and Germany, we put forward a
framework that deviates from and extends beyondmany
of the main theories of European integration (see also
Krotz & Schild, 2013, pp. 11–16). These existing theories
often focus primarily on general trends and outcomes in
integration but tend to say little about the precise forms
and mechanisms of European decision-making and crisis
management at particular moments in time. In contrast
to both neo-functionalism (Haas, 1958) and multi-level
governance approaches (Marks, Hooghe, & Blank, 1996),
we attribute amore prominent part to two large EUmem-
ber states. This focus also helps us to better account for
enabling or constraining factors for European coopera-
tion and integration, which might stem both from the
respective domestic environments in these two coun-
tries and from their bilateral relationship.
Concentrating on two key states, our theorizing
obviously connects to intergovernmentalism, which
holds true both for its classic formulation and Stanley
Hoffmann’s (1966) emphasis on the differences between
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national structures and cultures, and for Andrew
Moravcsik’s (1998) liberal mode and the process of
domestic preference formation. At the same time, we go
beyond these intergovernmentalisms in that we stress
political agency and strategizing and Franco-German
influence (or the lack thereof), both in concrete
moments (of crisis) and in the evolution of specific EU
policy fields. Lastly, we deviate from accounts of German
hegemony in the EU (Bulmer & Paterson, 2019) in that
we also look at policy fields in which German influence is
less pronounced and at instances in which Germany was
able to shape EU politics only in partnership with France.
3. Brexit
After his announcement of an in/out referendum on
British EU membership in January 2013 and his electoral
success in the UK parliamentary elections in June 2015,
Prime Minister Cameron reinforced his demands for a
new settlement and a renewed British position within
the EU. In the run-up to the Brexit referendum, Cameron
from summer 2015 onwards conducted negotiationswith
the EU’s other heads of state or government. He in partic-
ular asked for a formal exemption of the UK from the goal,
anchored in the preamble to the EU Treaties, to strive for
an ’ever closer Union’ and for the right to restrict the free
movement of people within the EU in order to reduce the
number of EU migrants coming to the UK.
The declared objective of the other member states
was to avert ‘Brexit’ and to compel the UK to stay in the
EU. According to some observers, Cameron hoped that
German Chancellor Merkel in particular would manage
to broker generous provisions on behalf of the EU, given
her prominent position amongst the European leaders
and the supposedly very major interest of German poli-
tics and industry in keeping the UK within the EU at any
cost (Webber, 2019, pp. 177–206). However, for the oth-
ermember states, therewere limits on how far theywere
willing to accommodate. As Merkel stressed in October
2015, for her the free movement of people in the EU
was non-negotiable. Similarly, France’s then-President
François Hollande ruled out a timely change to the EU
Treaties to meet Cameron’s demands, not least since
opening the Treaties could have triggered a French ref-
erendum with an uncertain outcome (Traynor, 2015).
In their European Council Conclusions of 18 and
19 February 2016, the heads of state or government
stressed the UK’s special status in the EU and promised
legal changes in the case of a Remain vote. Most notably,
they exempted the UK from ‘ever closer Union.’ In con-
trast, however, the heads did not alter the principle
of the free movement of people. The UK would be
given the right to restrict benefits for new migrants
for four years, but it would not have the right to sus-
pend intra-EU migration. In addition, the Conclusions
did not entail a concrete date or formal provisions for
a Treaty change to implement the agreed upon changes
(European Council, 2016a).
After the June 2016 referendum and during the exit
negotiations with the UK, the other EU member states
were keen to keep and foster the unity of the EU-27
and to minimize the incentives for further withdrawals.
Less than three months after the Brexit referendum, in
their Bratislava Declaration of 16 September 2016, the
heads of state or government stressed that despite the
UK’s decision to leave, “the EU remains indispensable
for the rest of us”; they were “determined to make a
success of the EU with 27 Member States” (European
Council, 2016b). At that meeting, they also endorsed the
‘Bratislava Roadmap,’ a work program for the coming
months to tackle pressing challenges such as migration,
external security, and economic development (European
Council, 2016b).
Starting on 1 October 2016, the EU-27 entrusted the
formal conduct of the exit negotiations to the European
Commission and the European Council and their new-
ly created Brexit task forces (Laffan, 2019). On vari-
ous occasions, France and Germany acknowledged the
importance of a future close relationship between the
EU and the UK, particularly in security, defense, and
intelligence policies. At the same time, however, they
stressed the integrity of the European single market with
its four freedoms (of people, labor, goods, and capital)
and excluded any special provisions for the UK. Speaking
to the German Bundestag on 28 June 2016, five days
after the Brexit referendum, Chancellor Merkel exclud-
ed “cherry-picking’’ when it came to access to the single
market and argued that as a future third country the UK
must not enjoy the same rights and privileges as it did
as an EU member. Moreover, Merkel ruled out separate,
bilateral negotiations between a single member state
and the UK government (“Merkel zum Brexit,” 2016).
France and Germany were determined to prevent
Brexit from becoming a success story, to highlight
the benefits of EU membership, and to avoid further
European rupture and disintegration. The new French
President Macron took a particularly tough stance on
the UK. In October 2019, he initially objected to a sec-
ond Brexit extension and urged the EU-27 to move on to
final British withdrawal (Rankin & Boffey, 2019). Overall,
the negotiations with the UK both before and after the
Brexit referendumhave shown that Germany and France,
as the UK’s first and third largest trading partners, pre-
ferred a smaller but still highly integrated EU to a larg-
er EU that could include the UK but would then be less
integrated. The stance of France and Germany and their
commitment to a highly integrated EU were crucial to
the unity of the EU-27 and to preventing other member
states seeking to follow the British example of withdraw-
ing from EU membership.
4. Covid-19
Beginning in early March 2020, Covid-19 spread rapid-
ly across EU member states, forcing governments to
impose tough constraints on individual outdoor and
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economic activities, as well as severe travel restrictions
even within the putative open-border Schengen area.
The Covid-19 lockdown led to an unprecedented decline
in member states’ economic output, increased unem-
ployment, rising expenditures for public health, and ris-
ing government debt levels. As it became clear, member
stateswere differently prepared to copewith the costs or
to initiate economic recovery. While Northern EU coun-
tries including Germany generally had rather sound pub-
lic finances and thus considerable fiscal leeway to pro-
vide national stimulus programs, Southern EU countries
such as Italy and Spain, but also France, had significantly
fewer available resources.
At the European Council meeting on 26 March 2020,
the EU’s heads of state or government articulated the
“unprecedented challenge” of the Covid-19 pandemic
and called for Eurozone finance ministers to present
proposals for a decisive common economic and fiscal
response (European Council, 2020a). However, there
weremajor discrepancies betweenmember states about
the adequate financing and allocation of a European
fiscal support package. On one side, France joined a
group of eight other EU countries calling for the intro-
duction of ‘Covid-19 bonds’ (the joint issuance and lia-
bility of government debt) and support in the form
of non-repayable grants (Dombey, Chazan, & Brunsden,
2020).On the other side, Germany, together with other
Northern EU countries like Austria and the Netherlands,
rejected Covid-19 bonds and insisted on the alloca-
tion of credits from the European Stability Mechanism,
the Eurozone’s permanent bailout fund, to the hardest-
hit countries. On 23 April 2020, the European Council
endorsed an initial European fiscal support package
worth €540 billion, consisting largely of credits from
the European Stability Mechanism. At the same time,
the heads of state or government indicated that they
deemed this first support package alone insufficient and
called upon the European Commission to present a time-
ly proposal for a European recovery fund (Council of the
EU, 2020).
Surprisingly for many, Macron and Merkel on 18
May 2020 presented a joint proposal for a temporary
recovery fund to be linked with the EU’s next multi-
annual budget. According to the Franco-German plan,
the Commission, on behalf of and backed by the mem-
ber states, would raise €500 billion on the financial
markets, which would then be distributed to the worst-
affected EU regions via grants (Bundeskanzlerin, 2020).
Politicians and analysts called the Franco-German plan
a potential turning point in the history of the EU, since
it would for the first time allow the Commission to
borrow money on such a scale. Some observers went
as far as to argue that the Franco-German initiative
marked a big step toward a European fiscal union and the
EU’s “Hamiltonian moment,” in reference to Alexander
Hamilton, the first treasurer of the US who summarized
the regions’ debt levels and issued new debt on behalf
of the federal government (Kaletsky, 2020).
The move towards common EU debt indeed marked
a remarkable deviation from the traditional German
stance, as did the proposal to distribute fiscal support
entirely in the form of grants rather than credits. So far,
Germany had opposed greater fiscal burden-sharing at
the EU level and the transfer of fiscal resources to
Europe’s poorer and most crisis-ridden regions. At the
same time, the plan also deviated from the former
French position in that the recovery fund would not be
financed through a new and timely unlimited EU instru-
ment, such as Covid-19 bonds. Instead, this would be a
one-time tool tied to the EU’s regular budget, with all
the associated oversight in terms of spending priorities
and economic reform efforts. Both France and Germany
thus had moved away from their former Southern and
Northern camps of supposedly like-minded countries
and shifted into the role of mediators, forging a bilateral
plan which could then serve as the blueprint for a broad-
er European comprise.
On 27 May, in the wake of the Franco-German ini-
tiative, the Commission presented its much-anticipated
proposal for a second European fiscal support pack-
age, which essentially consisted of two elements: first,
a European recovery instrument called ‘Next Genera-
tion EU’ and worth €750 billion, to be financed by
Commission borrowing and composed of almost two-
thirds in grants and the rest in loans and guaran-
tees; and second, a renewed proposal for the EU’s
next multi-annual budget totaling €1,1 trillion, to be
agreed upon by member states by the end of 2020,
with increased EU-spending on Covid-19-related issues
(European Commission, 2020). The Commission thus
largely adopted the size and financing rationale of the
Franco-German plan, while it added another €250 billion
in the form of credits.
When presenting the plan to the press on 18 May,
President Macron, not without pride, stated that “an
agreement between Germany and France is not an agree-
ment of the 27 [EU member states], but there can be no
agreement among the 27 if there is not already a Franco-
German agreement” (Fleming, Mallet, & Chazan, 2020).
Theheads of state or government endorsed the European
recovery fund, together with the EU’s next multi-annual
budget, at the four-day European Council summit in July
(European Council, 2020b). In the run-up to that sum-
mit, Merkel and Macron both in bilateral gatherings and
in several separate meetings with other national leaders
explored common ground and options for compromises.
According to two close observers, throughout the sum-
mit itself, Merkel and Macron were careful to follow a
common line, insisting on an agreement among the 27
member states (Gutschker & Wiegel, 2020).
5. Between Short-Term Crisis Management and
Longer-Term European Objectives
In view of existential threats to the EU and the future of
European integration—such as Brexit and the Covid-19
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crisis—France and Germany thus have repeatedly exer-
cised decisive European leadership. Keen to maintain
and further strengthen the unity of the EU-27, both coun-
tries set aside narrowly conceivednational and economic
self-interests during the Brexit negotiations. During the
Covid-19 crisis, France and Germany paved the way for
a common and comprehensive European fiscal support
package. Initially, the two countries had represented dif-
ferent camps, with France aligning with mostly Southern
EU countries to call for the introduction of Covid-19
bonds while Germany sided with other Northern coun-
tries and insisted on the allocation of credits only. In their
joint proposal for an EU recovery fund, however, each
deviated from its original stance. The Franco-German ini-
tiative formed the blueprint and necessary political back-
ing for the following Commission proposal and, eventu-
ally, the agreement of the 27 member states on the EU’s
response to the Covid-19 crisis. In terms of leadership,
it is an example of both agenda-setting and consensus-
building in order to overcome impasse amongst member
states, prevent the Covid-19 crisis from further escalat-
ing, and start Europe’s economic recovery.
At the same time, and apart from acute EU crisis
management, France and Germany have also refrained
repeatedly from assuming—or even failed to exercise—
political leadership. With regard to longer-term EU
reforms and objectives, we see some deep and funda-
mental discrepancies between France and Germany, and
among EU member states at large: Beyond the immedi-
ate reforms in the course and aftermath of the Eurozone
crisis, the future performance and resilience of Europe’s
monetary union remain uncertain. Shifts in global secu-
rity, and in transatlantic relations in particular, call for
a reorientation in European security and defense pol-
icy. Moreover, the ongoing disputes about the recep-
tion and relocation of refugees and the safeguarding
of the EU’s external borders threaten the functioning
of the European asylum system and, as a consequence,
the Schengen free-travelling area. In the following, we
explore each of these discrepancies in some more detail.
In his programmatic Sorbonne speech on the future
of Europe in September 2017, Macron called for a
“sovereign, united and democratic Europe.” Specifically,
he promoted more efforts and investments in the
autonomous defense of Europe and the creation of
“a common strategic culture,” “a common intervention
force,” and “a common defense budget.” He further
demanded a “common budget” for the Eurozone in
order to finance joint projects, cushion economic shocks,
and reduce economic imbalances within the Eurozone
(French Presidency, 2017). In that speech, delivered
just two days after the 2017 parliamentary elections in
Germany, Macron offered Chancellor Merkel and the
future German government “a new partnership” and a
privileged Franco-German role in the implementation
of these projects. And when awarded the prestigious
Charlemagne Prize for European unity in the German city
of Aachen in May 2018, Macron further elaborated on
his long-term goals for the EU. Repeating his calls for a
Eurozone budget,Macron explicitly called onGermany to
get over its “fetish” for budget surpluses and work with
him on forging deeper European economic integration
(“Macron’s EU,” 2018).
The German government, however, reacted remark-
ably passively toMacron’s advances. It was only inMarch
2019 that Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer,Merkel’s succes-
sor as party leader of the Christian Democratic Union,
presented her suggestions for the future of the EU,
which were largely interpreted as a response to Macron.
Regarding monetary union, Kramp-Karrenbauer did not
mention the possibility of further integration but instead
called formore “subsidiarity” andmember state “respon-
sibility” (Mühlherr, Schiltz, & Schuster, 2019). Further,
she caused opposition and open outrage in Paris by
suggesting that France, if it seeks a more effective EU,
should give up its permanent seat in the United Nations’
Security Council in favor of a European seat and should
sacrifice the part-time base of the European Parliament
in Strasbourg (“A conservative German response,” 2019).
This belated and half-hearted response reinforced
the image of a Germany that is quite satisfied with the
status quo in Europe, especially when it comes to eco-
nomic and fiscal policies. Indeed, a survey conducted at
the same time that Macron received the Charlemagne
prize showed that half of German voters thought his pro-
posals for economic and financial integration went “too
far” (“Emmanuel Macron receives Charlemagne Prize,”
2018). Only a few weeks later, more than 150 German
economists signed an open letter denouncing Macron’s
proposals and calling for national economic reforms
instead of disincentives and a European transfer union
(Plickert & Mussler, 2019). Not surprisingly, thus, the
German government—despite having formally approved
France’s call for a Eurozone budget in their Meseberg
declaration of June 2018—showed little enthusiasm to
seriously push the project forward, and it put up lit-
tle resistance when several smaller Northern EU coun-
tries substantivelywatered down the Eurozone budget in
the following months (Schoeller, 2020). Together, these
episodes illustrate that the German government shies
away from a profound reform and further development
of the Eurozone, fearing the joint liability for banks
and government debt, permanent fiscal transfers from
Europe’s North to its South, and a backlash from its elec-
toral base.
Regarding European defense, Chancellor Merkel had
already stated in May 2017 that the times in which
Europe “could fully rely on others” were over, asserting
that “we Europeans must really take our fate into our
own hands” (“Kanzlerin trotzt Trump,” 2017). She primar-
ily referred to theUS’ questioning ofmultilateral fora and
alliances such as NATO under President Donald Trump,
but also to Brexit (“Kanzlerin trotzt Trump,” 2017). On 11
December 2017, 25 EU member states agreed to inten-
sify their defense cooperation within the framework
of the Permanent Structured Cooperation. Due to the
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legally binding commitments of the member states, the
Permanent Structured Cooperation is themost advanced
form of defense cooperation in the EU. Together with
the European Defense Fund, established in June 2017 in
an effort to coordinate national investment in defense
research, the Permanent Structured Cooperation was
also a response to Brexit and the UK’s withdrawal from
the EU defense framework.
Germany’s supposedly more confident and vigor-
ous approach towards European security and defense
should meet France’s ambitions and stances in this pol-
icy field. Indeed, the European Intervention Initiative,
which Macron had also mentioned in his Sorbonne
speech, was officially formed in June 2018. In establish-
ing military cooperation between at first eight EU mem-
ber states and the UK outside the existing structures
of NATO, it could represent a significant step towards
European ‘strategic autonomy.’ Yet, the precise details,
competences, and resources of such novel alliances and
initiatives—and hence the future of European security
and the prospect of a proper European defense policy—
remain largely unclear. Despite its otherwise broad ambi-
tions, the Franco-German Treaty of Aachen from January
2019 in security and defense does not go beyond bilat-
eral consultations between the two countries, stopping
short of pooling resources and joint decision-making pro-
cedures (Seidendorf, 2019, pp. 198–200). It still holds
that security and defense remain the last bastions of
national sovereignty, including for these two countries.
Also, while France has long promoted greater European
defense autonomy, Germany has traditionally insisted on
a key role for NATO and a close partnership with the
US (Krotz & Sperling, 2011). To date, the security and
defense domains have thus seen only sporadic and often
half-hearted Franco-German leadership.
The EU’s asylum and migration policy is a third area
with rather limited Franco-German leadership over the
past years. In 2015 and 2016, the EU faced an unprece-
dented number of incoming refugees and migrants.
The severe disputes over their reception and reloca-
tion brought the Common European Asylum System to
the brink of collapse, while the partial reintroduction
of national border controls to contain the migratory
flows threatened the principle of free travel inside the
Schengen area. Germany, which received the most asy-
lum applications, sought to establish a refugee quota at
the EU level. Although France also advocated a more
equal distribution, President Hollande and his govern-
ment were much more reluctant to institute a perma-
nent and legally binding quota system. When Germany,
together with the European Commission, in March 2016
negotiated and concluded a political deal with Turkey
to lower the migratory flows to Europe, France hard-
ly played a role. Since then, either bilaterally or in a
small group ofmember states, France andGermany have
repeatedly advocated a new European asylum policy
and more intra-European burden-sharing. In September
2019, for example, the interior ministers of both coun-
tries, together with those from Italy and Malta, agreed
on the internal relocation of rescued refugees from the
Mediterranean Sea (“EU ministers in Malta,” 2019).
Overall, however, France and Germany have so far
not succeeded in putting the EU’s asylum and migra-
tion policy and the Common European Asylum System
on a more sustainable, reliable, and crisis-proof footing.
This is also because the two countries themselves often
do not agree on the next steps, as became apparent
with the mandatory quota system. In other instances,
France and Germany announced possible measures but
then did not pursue them credibly and in the longer
term: Both the German Interior Minister Thomas de
Maizière (in September 2015) and President Macron (in
April 2019) raised the option of excludingmember states
that overtly oppose the relocation of asylum-seekers
and other contributions to a common EU asylum policy
from the Schengen area. Yet, so far, the two countries
have backed away from proceeding in sub-groups of like-
minded member states and from engaging in forms of
differentiated integration.
Beyond these specific policy fields and challenges,
France and Germany are aware of their special bilater-
al relationship and their historical responsibility for the
European integration project. This they have repeated-
ly expressed, not least in the context of Brexit. In the
Meseberg declaration of 19 June 2018, both countries
expressed their determination to “further strengthen
their cooperation within the European Union” and at the
same time “to ensure the unity of themember states and
the performance of the Union” (Bundesregierung, 2018).
And in the Treaty of Aachenon22 January 2019, an exten-
sion of the Franco-German ‘Elysée’ friendship treaty
from 1963, both agreed to take their bilateral cooper-
ation to a new level, for example by further aligning
their economic, social, and tax systems and by creating
new instruments for cross-border cooperation (France
Diplomacy, 2019).
As the previous sections have shown, however, we
thus often see a gap between Franco-German leader-
ship in moments of acute threat to the EU, on the one
hand, and their role with regard to longer-term objec-
tives and more fundamental reforms in the EU—as well
as the commitments and symbolic gestures of the two
countries—on the other hand. Regarding the current
political leaders and elites in the two countries, we
also see differences in personal traits, ways of policy-
making, and visions for the future of the EU. President
Macron on various occasions called for prompt and large-
scale changes and reforms of particular EU policies and
the entire EU. These advances, however, led to reserva-
tions and sometimes open opposition in German gov-
ernment circles, which see them as premature or even
dangerous, and selective in that they seek to strength-
en France’s position and role in Europe. Conversely,
the often pragmatic but also hesitant political style of
Chancellor Merkel and other leading German politicians,
not least when it comes to greater German commitment
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in European financial and security affairs, has led to frus-
tration in Paris (Drozdiak, 2020, pp. 89–110).
6. Conclusions
The UK’s decision to leave the EU has once again moved
the Franco-German duo to center-stage in Europe. As the
two largest and most influential EU member states,
France and Germany’s joint role and leadership contin-
ue to be crucial for the future of Europe, its integra-
tion, and the politics of its union. This is even more the
case at a time when the EU is facing numerous crises,
challenges and disintegrative tendencies, and a grow-
ing asymmetry in the Franco-German relationship due
to a more dominant and at times complacent German
stance, particularly in economic terms. Despite initial
difficulties based on partly different preferences and
interests, France and Germany, at moments of existen-
tial threat for the EU and the European integration pro-
cess of the past decade, have exercised joint leadership.
A Franco-German agreement might not be sufficient for
consent at the EU level, but it is a necessary condition
for effective crisis management and the overcoming of
decision-making deadlocks amongst EU member states.
Absent Franco-German leadership, the European project
meanders between the poles of uninspired or reluctant
German preponderance on the one hand, and yet more
muddling through or stalling, on the other.
In the run-up to and the aftermath of the Brexit ref-
erendum, France and Germany were keen to preserve
the integrity of the European single market, to maintain
the unity of the remaining EU countries, and to prevent
further member state withdrawals. Their leaders took a
hard and unified line against the UK, signaling that as a
third country the UK would not enjoy the same benefits
as it did as a member state. In the course of the Covid-19
crisis, they set the political agenda and paved theway for
a comprehensive European fiscal support package, build-
ing a compromise among all member states to tackle the
economic damage caused by Covid-19 and to start recov-
ery. In this regard, France and Germany lived up to their
special role and historical vocation for European integra-
tion, which the political leaders of the two countries so
often stress.
By contrast, with regard to reforms and further devel-
opments in some specific EU policy fields and longer-
termEUobjectives, Franco-German leadershipwas often
less visible, sometimes only marginally successful, and
at other times even entirely absent. Regarding the
Eurozone, Germany has shown little enthusiasm and
appetite for major new steps. Discussions and negoti-
ations on the completion of banking union, for exam-
ple, are stalling, not least due to German reluctance.
The large Eurozone budget, called for by Macron to
make the Eurozone more stable and crisis-proof, was
decisively watered down with the (hidden) consent of
Berlin. With regard to EU security and defense, Germany,
despite a change in rhetoric, still is rather reluctant
when it comes to increasing defense spending and taking
part in military interventions. Finally, an overhaul of the
EU’s asylum and migration system and greater burden-
sharing among member states in terms of the reception
and relocation of asylum-seekers is clearly in Germany’s
interests and high up on the country’s political agen-
da. In light of half-hearted French support, however,
Germany alone has little backing or power to deeply
and lastingly reform EU asylum policy. For these longer-
term EU undertakings and objectives, thus, France and
Germany so far have been either unwilling or unable to
exercise joint leadership.
In sum, France andGermany aremore likely to supply
political leadership in moments of existential crisis and
threat when they manage to reconcile their own pref-
erences and interests. In these instances, there also is
a higher demand for leadership amongst other member
states so that Franco-German influence becomes more
legitimate and more likely to be successful, and to have
a substantial impact on EU politics. Things are rather dif-
ferent when it comes to more fundamental and longer-
term questions regarding particular EU policy fields and
the future of European integration. Here, profound dif-
ferences remain between the two countries’ priorities
and conceptions of the form, substance, and direction of
the EU. In addition, the rhetoric and political style often
diverge considerably in the two countries, and between
the French President and the German Chancellor in par-
ticular, making a common policy stance and initiatives
and hence a credible offer of Franco-German leader-
ship difficult.
Are there options that could plausibly replace or
supplement Franco-German leadership in the EU in the
foreseeable future? Indeed, other subgroups of member
states have sometimes joined forces to pursue certain
policy objectives. The Visegrád group of four Central and
Eastern EU countries fiercely opposed an EU refugee quo-
ta system. In EU budget negotiations, these countries
are keen to maintain large financial transfers through
the EU’s structural and cohesion funds. In the aftermath
of the Eurozone crisis, the ‘New Hanseatic League,’ a
group of economically liberal and trade-oriented mem-
ber states, called for a larger role for EU institutions
in scrutinizing national budgets and enforcing fiscal dis-
cipline. And during the Covid-19 crisis, a subgroup of
theHanse—the ‘frugals’: Austria, Denmark, Sweden, and
the Netherlands, at times with Finland’s open or tac-
it support—have demanded a more limited fiscal sup-
port package and pushed for a higher ratio of credits
to grants.
These coalitions, however, are more concerned with
blocking ormoderating (oftentimes far-reaching) propos-
als at the EU level thanwith providing credible leadership
options. When it comes to creative, constructive, and
bridge-building solutions to pressing problems and mea-
sures ultimately acceptable to all—or at least to a vast
majority of EU member states—there is still no credible
alternative to the Franco-German duo. In order to pro-
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vide leadership beyond moments of acute threat to the
EU, however, France and Germany must find even more
common ground, re-energize their bilateral relationship,
and pursue a joint role in EU politics. This may well
include cooperating in large subgroups of like-minded
member states and moving the EU towards more flexi-
ble integration schemes. The EU’s recent proposal for a
‘New Pact on Asylum andMigration’ might be a test case
for such an endeavor.
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